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during the past year should also be continued. The United States must be in a position to employ these programs with the utmost speed and precision to accomplish our goals under the swiftly shifting circumstances of the world.

Our country's participation in technical-cooperation programs must be vigorously advanced. Certain fundamentals are essential to their success. First, they should provide experts and know-how rather than large amounts of funds or goods, although they should not be allowed to fail due to lack of necessary teaching and demonstration equipment. Second, they should be tightly adjusted to the needs of the host countries. Third, they should be so administered as to reach as many people as possible, helping them raise their own standards of living and solve their own problems. Technical-cooperation programs now before the Congress are based on these fundamentals. These programs are our most effective countermeasure to Soviet propaganda and the best method by which to create the political and social stability essential to lasting peace.

Three months ago I advised the Congress that economic assistance on a grant basis should be terminated as swiftly as our national interest would allow. This concept underlies the new programs. In Europe economic assistance is recommended only for a few local programs of especial importance. As rapidly as feasible in our relationships with other countries, these programs are being supplanted by more durable undertakings in the field of mutually profitable private investment and trade. As such trade and investment expands, the need for grant assistance will further diminish. But this expansion takes time and effort. This requires that in strategically located, underdeveloped areas of the world, some grant assistance must be continued for an additional period of time. Such assistance is also needed for certain countries which lack the economic capacity to establish and equip military forces needed for the common defense.

Notwithstanding the continuing need for such grants, we must strive constantly toward relationships with our friends which are more satisfactory, both to them and to us, than grant assistance. This legislation should, therefore, reserve for loans not less than $100 million of the fiscal year 1955 funds. Such loans would be made where there is reasonable chance of repayment in dollars or in local currencies, and should be extended in a manner that would not substantially impair a country's capacity to borrow from private banking sources, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or the Export-Import Bank. This is a vital step toward the general replacement of grant economic assistance. We shall achieve this goal as quickly as world conditions and our national welfare permit.

In the administration of the mutual security program, agricultural surpluses will be used to strengthen the economies of friendly countries and to contribute in other ways to the accomplishment of our foreign policy objectives. We shall also attempt to use other products of our farms and the output of our industries whenever their use is consistent with the essential objectives of the program, after taking into account such factors as availability, price, and quality. In the conduct of these and other mutual security programs a Foreign Operations Administration performs a necessary function and should be continued.

The United States has chosen carefully from among many alternatives in order to chart a sound course in the world.

We have chosen to build defenses with our allies rather than go it alone, because we are convinced that this course is more effective and less costly.

We have chosen to help develop and expand world markets, because we believe that this course will strengthen the economies of all free nations, including our own.

We have chosen to exchange technical knowledge and ideas with our friends, because we believe that course will go far toward countering the effects of Communist propaganda, while at the same time promoting peace through improved political and economic stability.

Having embarked upon these courses of action, we shall follow them through. We did not choose the gigantic struggle now endangering the world, but surely this is clear: During periods when the contest is hardest, we must not falter, we must not abandon programs of positive action. Instead, at such a time we must intensify sensible and positive action.

This program of mutual security is such action; it is one of our most effective, most practical, least costly methods of achieving our international objectives in this age of peril.

I therefore strongly urge enactment of mutual security legislation along the lines I have herein generally outlined.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *June 23, 1954.*

NEED FOR PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON UNITED STATES FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Speaker, I have introduced today a bill, H. R. 9660, to create a Commission on United States Foreign Intelligence Activities. This will be a 9-man Presidential commission, 5 members of which shall be appointed by the President, who shall also designate the chairman. Four members are to be appointed from the Congress, 2 from the Senate and 2 from the House.

This commission will have two major responsibilities: First, to make a full and complete investigation of this country's foreign intelligence activities; and, second, to examine the security of these intelligence agencies from penetration by subversive elements. The findings and recommendations of the commission are to be submitted both to the Congress and the President on or before March 1, 1955.

I should like to make a few brief comments to explain why I am proposing this Commission on United States Foreign Intelligence Activities. In the first place, I think all of us here in Congress recognize that the adequacy, timeliness and overall effectiveness of our national intelligence effort is of vital importance to our national security. The effect of our tremendous military expenditures could be greatly lessened, or even nullified, if our intelligence system is ineffective or faulty. The very safety of our Nation would be jeopardized if we were not forewarned of a sneak attack. It is essential for us to have sound estimates on the intentions and capabilities of our potential enemies. We cannot afford another Pearl Harbor.

A commission such as I am proposing would make a thorough, intensive, and impartial survey of our foreign intelligence activities. No such inquiry has been made since shortly after the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. For that reason it is timely and appropriate to take this step now.

As we all know, the Congress has voted considerable sums for these intelligence agencies, and yet we know virtually nothing as to the scope and success of their operations. Members of the Appropriations Committee and the Armed Services Committee, it is true, have some knowledge of their expenditures and the types of activities involved, but no comprehensive study has been made. For that reason also it seems the part of wisdom for the Congress to authorize this investigation.

I realize that President Eisenhower, if he sees fit, could establish such a Commission without any legislative assistance. On the other hand this is a field where the Congress might logically take the initiative. By expressing congressional interest, we can authorize a discreet but thorough investigation supervised by a responsible and impartial Commission.

Others have suggested that a joint committee on the Central Intelligence Agency be established to provide continuous, and presumably discreet, check on that agency. I do not believe such an over-the-shoulder, watchdog committee is necessary. Furthermore, I think that it is preferable for a Presidential Commission to be established, with a majority of its members appointed by the President. These intelligence agencies are responsible to the executive branch, and they should be made primarily accountable to the President.

If we agree that a study of some kind is advisable, some of us may feel that an investigation by a congressional committee would be sufficient and appropriate. I definitely do not agree with such a view. The confidential and infinitely varied nature of our intelligence effort, it seems to me, precludes a public airing such as a congressional investigation would entail. It was realized in 1947 that publicity would perhaps defeat the purposes for which the Central Intelligence Agency was formed. For that reason the Congress exempted the CIA from the usual surveillance required of other

[illegible] proposal would [illegible] and [illegible] of [illegible] jeopardizing the effectiveness of certain vital governmental agencies. I hope that the Congress will give this proposal its prompt and serious consideration.

JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY

(Mr. JAVITS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. Speaker, the hearings in the other body respecting the Department of the Army have now closed but the problem of adopting rules of fair procedure and proper organization for congressional investigations of communism and subversion urgently demands solution at this session of the Congress. What we have seen in the other body makes this an indispensable element of the majority's program and as both Houses are so closely divided, equally—a responsibility of the minority.

The hearings showed the dangers of deep national division, distraction of the Congress from urgent business at a crucial moment in world history and damage to our country's prestige in the free world, and the whole country was shaken by the bid to Government employees to break security and their oaths of office. In the life and death struggle between the free world and the Communist imperialist and totalitarian world in this quotation marks "war," whether hot or cold, there can be only one Commander in Chief leading us and that under the Constitution is the President. What we have seen of an invitation to break down the President's authority in the Government must convince us that the interests of the country and the prestige of the Congress as the legislative arm of Government demand measures to end the dangers of excesses in these congressional investigations.

The powers of the Congress with respect to legislative oversight enable the most complete inquiry to be made into the affairs of Government departments. There is no reason why this power cannot be utilized by committees as such without incurring dangers inherent in individual Members acting on their own with respect to the authority vested in the committee.

The rules of procedure proposed in House Concurrent Resolution 202 have been drawn by outstanding legal authorities and represent elementary rules of fairness. Excesses in congressional [illegible] have shown that they are [illegible] and that rules adopted by such [illegible] themselves, without an adequate [illegible] taking the problem as a [illegible]. It [illegible] our tradition to safeguard individual rights at the [illegible] that we safeguard the public interest and [illegible] entirely practicable in this situation.

I am [illegible] following in a letter to the membership the request that they sign discharge petition No. 8 to take up before we adjourn the measure to establish a Joint Committee on Internal Security and to provide for statutory rules of procedure. It offers every Member a practical way to act on this urgent national issue. The text of the letter is appended hereto:

JUNE 23, 1954.

DEAR COLLEAGUE: The Senate hearings in the controversy between Senator MCCARTHY and the Army just terminated show now conclusively how excesses in congressional investigations of communism and subversion can (a) divide the country on fundamentals in which division is neither traditional nor good for the national interest, (b) distract the Congress, (c) seriously damage our country's prestige in the free world, and (d) jeopardize the essential division of powers in our Government between the President and the Congress. Under these circumstances remedial measures become an indispensible element of the majority's program and as both Houses are so closely divided equally a responsibility of the minority.

Discharge petition No. 8 which I have placed on the Speaker's desk seeks to bring up House Concurrent Resolution 202, to establish a Joint Committee on Internal Security and to provide for statutory rules of fair procedure. It offers members the opportunity to take remedial action on this vital national issue before the Congress adjourns. If the subject is successfully brought up on the discharge petition the House can work its will as to the remedy it desires to adopt.

Under House Concurrent Resolution 202 the joint committee would take the place of the House committee and the two Senate subcommittees dealing with investigations of communism and subversion and would be organized and operate in a way analogous to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The joint committee could refer specific investigations to standing legislative committees or call for the appointment of select committees or statutory commissions to handle particular investigations. The [illegible] of procedure provided in [illegible] Resolution 202 will [illegible] individuals of these [illegible] investigations and [illegible] tain the prestige [illegible] power to investigate [illegible] those sponsored by [illegible] bar of the city of New [illegible] ing bar associations.

I hope very much [illegible] favorably the prompt [illegible] petition No. 8.

[illegible]

RIGHT[illegible] CON[illegible] GRES[illegible] TION

(Mr. HOFFMAN of [illegible] and was given permission [illegible] House for 1 minute and to [illegible] tend his remarks.)

Mr. HOFFMAN of M[illegible] Speaker, [illegible]

New York [Mr. JAVITS] just said may be all very well, but where does it get us? My short experience of 20 years with congressional investigations—and I was chairman of a one-man com[illegible] in 1936—is that whether [illegible] treated fairly, whether an [illegible] is conducted as it should be, w[illegible] rights of citizens are properly protected, whether a good result finally comes from the investigation, depends almost entirely not upon rules, but upon the characteristics of the members of the committee which conducts the investigation.

On the issue as to whether [illegible] employees should give inform[illegible] inefficiency or violations of [illegible] Federal statutes to Members of the Senate or the House, we have in the past had some top officials who did not pay any attention when they were told about Communists. It may be just possible—not probable—that you might have someone at the head of an executive department who was in sympathy with an unlawful activity.

Of course, it is the business of the executive departments to enforce the law, and information of violations of law should first be given to them, but when the law is not enforced, when an official or an agency will not act, when they cover up for a crook, is every Federal employee to keep secret all the information he may have after he has given it to the executive department? After the Federal employee has given information showing violations of the law or treason itself to the proper executive officers and no action has been taken, has he not a right to go to his Senator or to his Member of Congress and tell him of the improper procedure of the commission of a crime?

Now, think it over a little. Are we all to cover up for every crook in every executive agency or department? Think about it before you form an opinion

SPECIAL ORDERS

Mr. SHEEHAN asked and was given permission to address the House for 15 minutes on tomorrow, Thursday, following any special orders heretofore entered.

Mr. JAVITS asked and was given permission to vacate the [illegible] granted to him for today.

RULES OF PROCEDURE [illegible] GRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

(Mr. CLARDY asked [illegible] permission to address [illegible] minute and to revise [illegible] remarks.)

Mr. CLARDY. Mr. S[illegible] [illegible] to say anything [illegible] from New York [illegible] I commend [illegible] the [illegible] rules of [illegible] American [illegible] and faith with [illegible] which we have adopted [illegible] still [illegible] we need to have a statute [illegible] do the same things, then I [illegible] from my position.

[illegible] statement that [illegible] gone [illegible] to be fair with the traitors in our [illegible] that we have leaned over back-